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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
and their descendants; (2) his lineal and collateral ma-
ternal relatives by representation; and (3) his natural
parents and everyone in their bloodstream on the con-
tingency that the father subsequently marries and ac-
knowledges the illegitimate as his own. The following
parties are allowed to inherit from the illegitimate:
(1) his mother or her heirs at law, including legiti-
mate children, if she be dead, providing the illegitimate
has died without issue or collateral heirs, i.e., other
illegitimates and their descendants; (2) other illegitimates
of the same mother and their descendants.
The real question is how far the legislature in each
particular jurisdiction should go in the removal of the
Common Law disabilities on inheritance by and from
bastards? There seems no valid reason for cutting off his
rights of inheritance at the mother, or maternal relatives,
or at the father if he subsequently marries the child's
mother and acknowledges the child as his own. This
writer recommends that they be completely removed and
the illegitimate child, for purposes of inheritance, be
placed in the bloodstream of his natural parents. All re-
cent legislation tends in this direction, but few states have
been willing to go this far. The erring parents could still
protect their estates since in all jurisdictions but
Louisiana they possess a complete right to disinherit even
legitimate children by testamentary disposition.
The real evil is the illicit intercourse of the parents, not
the birth of the bastard. The doctrine of nullius filius pun-
ishes the only innocent party to the whole affair, and the
placing of a stigma on him has certainly had small de-
terrent effect on illegitimacy. Any punitive measures
should in fairness fall upon the wrongdoing parents, not
the illegitimate. DxNIEL W. MOYLAN
Sufficiency Of Description In A
Chattel Mortgage
Phillips v. J. F. Johnson Lumber Company'
In August 1955, one Glover executed and recorded a
chattel mortgage to the appellee, Johnson, covering several
passenger motor vehicles and motor trucks, as well as
sundry equipment, including the subject of the present
suit, "l-Terratrac Bulldozer loader - Model 30", the only
such piece of equipment which Glover owned. All of the
1218 Md. 531, 147 A. 2d 843 (1959).
[VOL. XX
1960] PHILLIPS v. JOHNSON LUMBER CO.
vehicles except the loader were described by year and
serial number, as well as by make and type. In May, 1956,
Glover bought an International Crawler Tractor under a
conditional sales contract and gave Edward P. Phillips,
the vendor, his Terratrac loader, Model 30, in part payment.
Phillips made no examination of the chattel records to
determine whether there was a lien upon the loader. John-
son Lumber Company sued the appellants, trading as
Phillips Machinery and Tractor Company, for conversion
of the loader in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
and obtained a verdict and judgment of $1,200.00. Upon
stipulation by the parties, the sole question to be decided
was whether the loader was sufficiently identified by the
description in the recorded chattel mortgage to charge a
subsequent bona fide purchaser for value with constructive
notice of the mortgagee's lien.
Phillips contended that the description of a piece of
mass-produced machinery must contain the serial number.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court, held
that the description as given was sufficient to enable a third
party to identify the loader, where it was the only one of its
kind owned by the mortgagor.
The pertinent sections of the Annotated Code of Mary-
land are not particularly helpful in dealing with the
problem of sufficiency of description. Under Article 21,
Section 46 thereof,2 a mortgage of personal property shall
be executed in the same manner as bills of sale; and
under Section 42 "any bill of sale 'of personal property shall
be sufficient in form if it contains the names of the parties,
the consideration, a description of the property conveyed,
and be signed and sealed by the vendor and dated."3
A somewhat more explicit Code section is Article 21,
Section 5 dealing with requirements of a valid deed con-
veying real estate, one ,of which is that it should contain
"a description of the real estate sufficient to identify -the
same with reasonable certainty."4  The most detailed
description required, however, is to be found in a statute
(not a recording statute) ,' which requires the serial number
of a motor vehicle to be stated in an application for a cer-
tificate of title thereon or for registration thereof.
6
12 MD. CODE (1957).
'Ibid. § 42.
'2 MD. CODE (1957).
16 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66%, § 24(a) (2).
"This section does not appear applicable to the kind of equipment
here involved. See Art. 66Y2, §§ 2(55) and 23. Perhaps the reason for
the more detailed description of motor vehicles than of the bulldozer in
283
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The prevalent rule as to :sufficiency of description laid
down by text writers, and apparently by judicial authority,
is that a mortgage conveying chattels, when recorded, in
constructive notice of a lien to third persons if the descrip-
tion in the instrument is such as will enable them to identify
the property together with inquiries which the mortgage
itself suggests and directs. A less certain description would
appear adequate as between the mortgagor and mortgagee,
alone.7
The description should be certain enough that the chattel
can be distinguished from other like property. In short,
as the legal maxim advises: "That is certain, which is
capable of being made certain."8 If the description is made
specific by extrinsic facts, it will be satisfactory to give
notice.
In State for Use of Horsey v. Maryland Casualty Com-
pany9 it was held that a description of sundry chattels"
in a bill of sale was insufficient as to pass title even between
the immediate parties thereto because it was general in
nature. The Maryland Court held in Fersner v. Bradley1
a bill of sale conveying a "one-half interest in 8 horses,
one-half interest in five single buggies, one-half interest in
six double rigs, one-half interest in 3 sets double harness.
'12 was insufficient to pass title against a judgment
creditor of the vendor, noting that no description was given
which would enable other interested -persons to form an
Johnson's mortgage may have been the ready availability of such de-
scription on the registration cards pertaining to those vehicles. See the
instant case, supra, n. 1, 540. See also 2 MD. CODi (1957) Art. 21, § 66 re-
lating to conditional sales contracts.
I First National Bank v. Maxwell, 200 N.W. 401, 198 Iowa 813 (1924);
United States v. Christensen, 50 F. Supp. 30 (D.C. Ill. 1943) ; Security
State Bank v. Jones, 247 P. 862, 121 Kan. 396 (1926) ; In re Oliver C.
Putney Granite Corp., 14 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. Md. 1936) ; Salabes v. Castel-
berg, 98 Md. 645, 57 A. 20 (1904) ; U. S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Merrick,
171 Md. 476, 190 A. 355 (1937); Jackson City Bank and Trust Co. 53
N.W. 2d 493, 333 Mich. 399, 32 A.L.R. 2d 920 (1952); Tilton v. Wade,
2 F. 2d 358 (4th Cir. 1924); Elgin v. Dehart; 144 Va. 311, 132 S.E. 323
(1926) ; 10 Am. JuR., Chattel Mortgages, § 55; JoNES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES
AND COND TOAL SALES, (1933 ed. and 1956 Supplement) §§ 54, 55.
'14 C.J.S. 57, Chattel Mortgages. See also 10 Am. Jur., Chattel Mort-
gages, §§. 53, 55; Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Kaufman
v. Howell, 268 S.W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
p164 Md. 69, 163 A. 856 (1933).
10The bill of sale merely bargained and sold "8 Lupton Steel Bins and
parts; 1 Lupton steel show case, 1 desk, 2 chairs, 1 National Cash
Register, 1 Ohio generator test stand, 1 Jefferson Coil tester, 1 Tunger
Blattery charger, 25 fenders; 7 wheels, 2 truck wheels; 3 tractors; 3 sets
tractor fenders; 1 Oakland Touring Car; 1 Ford Touring car; 1'Ford
coupe; 1 rolling jack." Ibid., 75-76.
"87 Md. 488, 40 A. 58 (1898).
Ibid., 489.
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idea as to what particular vehicles were intended to be
included.
The scarcity or plentitude of chattels of a similar kind
is important to consider. The non-existence of other prop-
erty to which the terms of the mortgage could apply
frequently renders valid a description in a mortgage which
otherwise would be too indefinite. In a number of cases
the fact that an implement or vehicle was the only one
of its kind owned by the mortgagor has been 'held to support
the sufficiency of a description, even though clarification
of the description was partly dependent upon extrinsic
evidence.'-
A poignant example is U.S. v. Christensen"4 in which a
chattel mortgage describing the property as "one tractor,
Moline, 10-20 Farmall, condition good, year of manufac-
ture 1937" was held by the Illinois district court to be
adequate to put third parties on inquiry where the tractor
was the only implement of its kind owned by the mort-
gagor.'5 However, in Hayes v. Wilcox," an earlier Iowa
case, the court held the description in a chattel mortgage
"one Oscillation thresher, size 6, 30 inch cylinder, and also
one Chicago Pitts ten-horse power" to be too indefinite to
be sustained.
Another factor of importance is the location of the
mortgaged chattels. The rule here set out is basic and
comprehensive:
"A statement of the exact situs of mortgaged prop-
erty is of great service in identifying it, and it is
enough that the location of the property may be de-
termined by fair inferences drawn from the entire
instrument. Although it is generally not a sufficient
location to say that chattels are in a certain county, or
in a certain city or town, with nothing more, in agri-
cultural communities a statement that the mortgaged
property is in the mortgagor's possession in a certain
county seems to be sufficient.""
"See 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages, § 59, and cases cited.
,50 F. Supp. 30 (D.C. Ill. 1943).
Note the similarity of the description and result in the Christensen
case and the principal case. Also see Jackson City Bank and Trust Co.
v. Blair, 53 N.W. 2d 493, 333 Mich. 399, 32 A.L.R. 2d 920 (1952), and
Osborne v. McAllister, 19 N.W. 510, 15 Neb. 428 (1884) in which like
descriptions were upheld.
1117 N.W. 110, 61 Iowa 732 (1883). See also Plano Mfg. Co. v. Griflith,
39 N.W 213, 75 Iowa 102 (1888) In which a description: "one six y2 foot
cut Plano harvester and binder" was held too indefinite.
17 6 CycOLroiiA or LAW AND PROCEURE (1903 ed.) 1024, 1025.
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In In re Oliver C. Putney Granite Corporation8 Judge
Chesnut relied heavily upon the fact that the location of
certain mortgaged chattels was set out; 9 and was able to
distinguish this case from the Horsey case, 0 wherein the
location of the chattels was not specifically stated.2'
In general, although chattels should be specifically
described, something less than the best possible descrip-
tion may be sufficient.22 The Court of Appeals held in
Salabes v. J. Castelberg and Sons,21 that a description. which
referred to a diamond ring by the name of the jeweler and
the number of carats was sufficient. In so holding the court
said:
"... in this case, as the only description that could
reasonably be expected was given, and that was ample
to put persons dealing with the ring on inquiry, the
mortgagees should not be made to suffer."2 '
It seems fair to say that although a description may
be meager, if it gives a fair clue to the identity of the
property so that a third person by reasonable investigation
may ascertain the property which the parties intended
to include in the mortgage, the instrument may be regarded
as creating a valid lien.
DONALD NEDLE
S14 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. Md. 1936).
'The description In the chattel mortgage read:
.. .all the tools, machinery, appliances[,] and other personal prop-
erty now used by the mortgagor in the 'operation of its stone-cuttting
plant located upon the real estate hereinbefore described, including
specifically one Electric Crane[,] one Electrically driven Compressor[,]
one Gang Saw[,] Carborundum 'Saw[,] Polishing Mill[,] Surfacing
machine and Pneumatic tools." Ibid., p. 33.
s°164 Md. 69, 163 A. 856 (1933).
14 F. Supp. 31, 34 (D.C. Md., 1936). ;See also Bowman-Boyer Co. v.
Burgett, 192 N.W. 795, 195 Iowa 674 (1923) in which a description of
a chattel was upheld where the mortgage not only gave the township and
county and state where the property was situated, but also the location
of ,the farm on which the property was kept. See Elgin v. Dehart, 144 Va.
311, 132 S.E. 323 (1937).
w See Fire Insurance Co. v. Merrick, 171 Md. 476, 487, 190 A. 335,
340 (1937).
298 Md. G45, 57 A. 20, (1904).
-Ibid., 654.
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